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F26QkorS 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 13 CR 428 (PAE) V. 4 Sentence RAYMOND KORNEGAY 5 Defendant -----x 6 7 New York, N.Y. February 6, 2015 8 11:15 a.m. 9 Before: 10 HON. PAUL E. ENGELMAYER 11 District Judge 12 APPEARANCES 13 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the 14 Southern District of New York 15 BROOKE CUCINELLA Assistant United States Attorney 16 SARAH KUNSTLER 17 Attorney for Defendant Kornegay 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 (In open court; case called) 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Government ready? MS. CUCINELLA: Brooke Cucinella on behalf of the 3 government standing in for Andrea Griswold. Good morning. 4 5 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Cucinella. 6 MS. KUNSTLER: Good morning, your Honor. Sarah 7 Kunstler for Mr. Kornegay. THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Kunstler. 8 9 Good morning, Mr. Kornegay. 10 THE DEFENDANT: Good morning, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: I am going to begin by reviewing the 12 materials I've received in connection with sentencing. 13 before proceeding any further, I want to take up the issues 14 presented in Mr. Kornegay's letter of January 14 which I 15 circulated to counsel. We are here today to impose sentence in the case of 16 17 United States v. Raymond Kornegay. On January 15 of last year, Mr. Kornegay was convicted after a three-day trial of one count 18 of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and of three 19 20 substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery, each of which were keyed to a particular robbery of a cell phone store. 21 22 In preparation for today's proceeding, I reviewed my 23 notes of the trial to refresh my memory. I also reviewed the 24 presentence report dated October 31, 2014 including the

recommendation and addendum to that report.

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I've also received the following additional submissions: The defendant's very thoughtful and helpful submission dated December 19, 2014, which in turn is accompanied by an appendix of exhibits. Second, a letter from Mr. Kornegay raising questions about his representation which I circulated to counsel as an attachment to an order I issued on January 21, 2015. And the government's submission which was also very thoughtful and helpful dated January 20, 2015.

Have the parties received each of these submissions?

MS. CUCINELLA: Yes, your Honor.

MS. KUNSTLER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have any additional submissions been made in connection with sentencing?

MS. CUCINELLA: No, your Honor.

MS. KUNSTLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Before proceeding any further, I just want to take up the letter from Mr. Kornegay again dated January 14. I took Mr. Kornegay to again be raising the question of his wanting to receive the document that he believes contains some waiver by him going back to 2013, which a series of counsel have now represented they've tried to find or identify and have been unable to do so.

Ms. Kunstler, have you had an opportunity to discuss with your client the letter that Mr. Kornegay wrote to the Court?

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1 MS. KUNSTLER: Yes, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: What is the status of your discussions with him about that? 3 4 MS. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, Mr. Kornegay's position 5 remains the same. It is a little bit -- I'm a little bit 6 uncomfortable -- it's hard for me to -- I'd prefer for 7 Mr. Kornegay to respond to it, actually, because it's --THE COURT: Let me try it this way. 8 9 MS. KUNSTLER: OK. 10 THE COURT: I need to know whether it is appropriate 11 or not to go ahead with sentencing today, and I need to 12 understand the biggest picture of whether or not Mr. Kornegay 13 is comfortable with your representing him in connection with 14 sentencing. Without disclosing any attorney/client 15 communications, can you give me an insight as to the state of the attorney/client relationship? 16 17 MS. KUNSTLER: Could you give me one moment, your Honor? 18 19 THE COURT: Of course. 20 (Pause). 21 MS. KUNSTLER: Mr. Kornegay would prefer not to go 22 ahead with sentence. 23 THE COURT: Is there anything you can tell me as to 24 why?

MS. KUNSTLER: The issue remains the same.

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is -- on June 7, 2013 there was a court appearance for which we obtained an audio recording and a written transcript.

Mr. Kornegay believes this record is incomplete and that the audio and the transcript don't reflect what the full nature of what happened at that appearance.

THE COURT: OK.

Mr. Kornegay, I am prepared to go forward with sentencing today. I have received quite effective sentencing submissions from both sides, including from your lawyer.

In fact, it's a very impressive sentencing submission. I understand that there remains this issue that has been a source of concern for you for some time about some form of waiver that you believe you were forced to or did make in June of 2013, which apparently is not reflected in any written or audio material you've gotten.

I will tell you that based on my review of all the material, even assuming something of that nature happened there, it's entirely irrelevant to sentencing. There is no right that I'm aware of that you gave up. It has not in any way affected your rights in the trial or the sentencing proceeding. So I am a little bit lost as to what relevance it has.

If you're saying something different, which is that you have some discomforts with Ms. Kunstler as your counsel, I would welcome knowing that because it may or may not require me

to consider that representation. I will tell you though that the quality of the submission Ms. Kunstler made was quite fine.

Mr. Kornegay, what is your view? Do you want to go forward today? If not, why not?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I came here with the intentions to move forward, but — if me relieving Ms. Kunstler as my attorney is going to put a hold on my sentencing, I would rather not then. I would just move forward. But if it's possible that I can obtain new counsel after today's date, you know, further on for my appeal, if it's possible because, you know, my requests are pretty hard to get accomplished for me. It's been like that throughout my whole process, so it's like I'm not sure —

THE COURT: Mr. Kornegay, I'm trying to understand what you are saying. Do you have any hesitation about the work that Ms. Kunstler has done in representing you in connection with sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: Mmm, I can say no, not -- not as much. As far as she puts it all together, I think she did a pretty good job, but just like through the process I felt that we just weren't seeing eye to eye.

THE COURT: In other words, is there anything you wanted to have brought to my attention in connection with the sentencing process that has not been brought to my attention?

THE DEFENDANT: Nah. No.

THE COURT: For example, I've received quite a number of letters from you that give me some insight, for example, into your life experience independent of the events that gave rise to the indictment in this case.

THE DEFENDANT: Mmm-hmm.

THE COURT: I found that to be helpful. What I am asking you is: Before we go forward here, I want to make sure there isn't something that you wanted to have before me that wasn't put before me. Did she bring to my attention everything you wanted her to?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: No, she did not --

THE DEFENDANT: No, she did not bring what I wanted her to bring -- for your attention, for you to know.

THE COURT: What was it that's missing?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I sent you my request in the reconstruction of the hearing because that -- that had a lot to do with me moving forward with the counsel that I've had.

That's why as on record it shows that I've had numerous of counsel because of this situation.

THE COURT: Right. I guess what I am trying to understand is, Mr. Kornegay, what happened in your view at that hearing that you think would be relevant to sentencing.

THE DEFENDANT: The fact that I was -- that in court, you know, I signed documents that I didn't know what I was

signing and the fact that my lawyer dismissed me having knowledge of this to the magistrate judge at the time because he asked if I understood what was going on, but my lawyer took it upon herself to go yes, and I didn't really know.

THE COURT: Look, I appreciate that, and this is consistent with what you have been concerned about at other points in this case.

Let me say this if it is any reassurance: Whatever happened that day in magistrate's court is completely irrelevant to me in terms of determining what a just and reasonable sentence is for you. Under the law, in imposing sentence, as you know — and as I will review when sentencing goes forward — I am to consider a variety of factors under what is called the Sentencing Statute, Section 3553(a). One of them is the Sentencing Guidelines. Another involves a variety of factors, including your life history and your characteristics, the interests of deterrence, the interest of just punishment, the interest of incapacitation, various factors that I know you're aware of.

Whatever happened procedurally back in magistrate's court back in June of 2013 simply doesn't bear on any of those considerations. Whatever happened there would not in any way, shape or form affect the sentence that I impose here.

So, I understand that you are distressed that what you recall having happened in magistrate's court is not being

reflected in the materials that your counsel have gotten to you. I can't sort that out, but I can tell you that it has nothing to do with this proceeding. I am not aware as I sit here now of any meaningful right that you gave up. The whole way the case has proceeded has been with your having invoked all of your rights, including, importantly, the right to go to trial and put the government to its proof.

So, I hope that is of some help to you in understanding where I'm coming from. If you would like an adjournment of sentencing, I need to understand just a little more about why. Is there some information, putting aside the June 2013 hearing, that you wanted Ms. Kunstler to bring to my attention in connection with sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: In connection with the sentencing, no; but for my appeal purpose, yes.

THE COURT: In other words, after sentencing -THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: -- I will advise you that you have a right to appeal, and that if you want to file a notice of appeal that there is a deadline for doing so. I'm sure Ms. Kunstler will assist you with that.

Your point though is that you would like a different lawyer to represent you in connection with your appeal than Ms. Kunstler?

(212) 805-0300

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Why is that? 2 MS. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, if I may? 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MS. KUNSTLER: I think that this is a -- that I would 5 be happy to file a notice of appeal on behalf of Mr. Kornegay, 6 but we do have different opinions on the best way to proceed 7 here that I think are irreconcilable in terms of the best course of action on appeal. I think I would with the support 8 9 of -- with the support of Mr. Kornegay, I was intending to file 10 such a letter after filing the notice with the appellate court. 11 THE COURT: I take it, Mr. Kornegay, you would be 12 seeking a new court-appointed lawyer to assist you with appeal? 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Ms. Kunstler, look, I will be happy to 15 receive that application assuming as you represent that there is enough of a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship as 16 17 it relates to what the content of an effective appeals brief would look like. 18 If you get me a prompt letter, I will arrange for the 19

If you get me a prompt letter, I will arrange for the appointment of a new lawyer for Mr. Kornegay. I will ask you to assist him with the filing of a notice of appeal to make sure that his rights are not prejudiced in that way, but please get me an application for such an appointment urgently.

MS. KUNSTLER: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: It may be that I need -- I expect I will

need to have a conference with you and Mr. Kornegay at some point after sentencing on which a new duty attorney is here who can take over for you if I decide to grant that application.

MS. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, in situations like this in the past what I've normally done is file the notice and then file a motion to withdraw with the circuit. I don't know that you need to be involved in it, although if the Court wants to entertain that application and do it here, we can do that.

THE COURT: That's fine. If the circuit will be amenable to the application, I'm glad for the circuit to do it inasmuch as it is about the appeal. So I will just put on the record this then to the extent it is helpful to Mr. Kornegay in connection with seeking a new lawyer.

Mr. Kornegay has indicated that he is fine with the materials that have been submitted in connection with sentencing, but he has indicated that there is some difference of opinion between him and Ms. Kunstler as to how best to represent his interests on appeal. Ms. Kunstler in turn has confirmed that after thoughtful review, there is some difference of opinion between her and Mr. Kornegay.

I, therefore, on the basis of what's been represented to me agree, that it would be well worth it for Mr. Kornegay to get new counsel on appeal.

Ms. Kunstler, you're at liberty to bring that to the Court of Appeals' attention to the extent you are applying to

be relieved, and to have a new lawyer substituted for you. 1 2 Thank you, your Honor. I may bring it MS. KUNSTLER: 3 before this Court given this is an unusual case with the number of lawyers that have preceded me, so I may consider which path 4 5 to take. 6 THE COURT: I leave it to your good judgment. But 7 either way you're responsible for filing a notice of appeal and 8 either way please do that soon. 9 MS. KUNSTLER: Absolutely. 10 THE COURT: With that, Mr. Kornegay, are you 11 comfortable proceeding ahead with sentencing today? 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 13 THE COURT: Ms. Kunstler, is there any reason why I 14 shouldn't proceed with sentencing today? 15 MS. KUNSTLER: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Ms. Cucinella? 16 17 MS. CUCINELLA: No, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Then I need to go through some of the 19 formalities here before we get to the heart of the matter, 20 which is getting the views of each party as to the appropriate 21 sentence. 22 Ms. Kunstler, have you read the presentence report? 23 MS. KUNSTLER: I have, your Honor.

Yes.

MS. KUNSTLER:

THE COURT: Have you discussed it with your client?

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1 THE COURT: Mr. Kornegay, have you read the 2 presentence report? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 4 THE COURT: Have you discussed it with Ms. Kunstler? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 6 THE COURT: Have you had opportunity to go over with 7 her any errors in the report or anything else that should be 8 taken up with the Court? 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Ms. Cucinella, have you reviewed the 11 presentence report? 12 MS. CUCINELLA: I have. 13 THE COURT: Let's put aside the calculation of the 14 Sentencing Guidelines for now and just look at factual 15 accuracy. Are there any objections to the presentence report regarding its factual accuracy? I do note that there are a 16 17 couple of factual errors that the defense has drawn to my 18 attention in paragraph 85. Putting those aside, is there anything else? 19 20 MS. CUCINELLA: Not from the government. 21 MS. KUNSTLER: No other objection to factual accuracy, 22 your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Turning to paragraph 85, which is entitled 24 educational, vocational or special skills, the defense has

requested that I attach as an exhibit Mr. Kornegay's high

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school equivalency diploma. I'm glad to do that.

Second of all, the defense has asked that in paragraph 85 it be added that the defendant had vocational training in business skills and building maintenance during a prior period of incarceration. I'm glad to add that as well.

Ms. Kunstler, does that respond to the factual objections the defense raised?

MS. KUNSTLER: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there anything further?

MS. KUNSTLER: No.

THE COURT: Hearing no other objections then, I will adopt the factual recitations set forth in the presentence report with the modifications I've made today in paragraph 85 of the attachment. The presentence report will be made part of the record in this matter. It will be placed under seal. In the event appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed report without further application to this Court.

Is there any reason why the parties' sentencing submissions should not be publicly filed?

MS. CUCINELLA: The government doesn't see any.

MS. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, we submitted redacted filings with respect to Dr. Drob's report.

THE COURT: That's fine. My concern is always that the sentencing submission, at least as redacted, be publicly filed as opposed to being left out of the public record

entirely; but if you have made appropriate redactions, those are fine. But do make sure the balance is publicly filed. It sounds like it has been.

MS. KUNSTLER: Yes.

THE COURT: Very good.

The first step then in the sentencing process is for me to calculate how the Sentencing Guidelines apply here.

Although the Court is not required to follow the Sentencing Guidelines, I am required to consider the applicable guideline in determining what a reasonable sentence is. Therefore, to do so, it is necessary that I accurately calculate the guideline range.

Here, the parties dispute several aspects of how the guidelines apply, and I am going to resolve those disputes. Please advised though — and I am going to say this again with equal clarity later in the proceedings — that in this case, it is the underlying facts more than the guidelines' application to them that is what matters to me. So, it is those facts, not the guidelines, that influence me in determining what the just and reasonable sentence is. But I nevertheless have to go through the exercise of determining how the guidelines apply, so here it goes:

The first issue involves calculating the offense level. I am going to do that first on the assumption that the career offender guideline did not apply and then on the

opposite assumption.

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On the assumption that it does not apply, I find the offense level to be 26. I share the conclusions in the presentence report that Section 2B1.3 applies; that there are three groups, one for each of the robberies underlying substantive Counts 2 through 4; that the base offense level for each is 20; and that a three-level enhancement applies for the Eighth Avenue and Park Avenue robberies for the brandishing or possession of a dangerous weapon pursuant to Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). Now, I understand that, the defense disputes this adjustment, but I find it to be applicable both as to the wire cutters and separately as to the knife. It seems to me obvious that both a knife and sharp wire cutters are dangerous weapons within the meaning of the quidelines. The evidence at trial was clear that these were brandished and indeed, in some instances, the threats of physical harm were made by one of the robbers, which at least implicitly was a threat referencing that the object carried by the robbers could be used on a store employee were there resistance.

I also find that the brandishing of the knife, even to the extent it was made by a confederate of Mr. Kornegay's, was foreseeable to him. Mr. Kornegay was present in the T-Mobile store on Sixth Avenue when the knife was brandished to a security guard. There was also testimony that during the March 2, 2010 robbery of the AT&T store, one of the workers,

Stephen Rosario, explained that one of the robbers was displaying a knife. Mr. Kornegay was present for that robbery too. The broader context supports that he was aware of the weapons brought and brandished. Mr. Kornegay was a participant in each of the nine robberies. There was a common modus operandi to them. The robbers were in close proximity to one another during the robberies and the brandishing of the knife was of a piece with the brandishing of the wire cutters. Both were used to get store employees to back off from blocking the robbers, from interfering with the robbery or the robbers' getaway.

In addition, the adjustment applies if the dangerous weapon was possessed. Under the circumstances, it was totally foreseeable to Mr. Kornegay that a knife would be possessed by one of his fellow robbers. There is no basis on which I can find that bringing the knife to a robbery by a co-conspirator was an ultravires or unexpected act by the individual robber acting alone and outside the common plan of the group.

I realize the government in an earlier offered plea agreement that was rejected by the defense was not going to pursue this adjustment. That, however is legally irrelevant. The determination would have been made even under those circumstances by the Court, not by the government; and the government's forbearance in order to secure a plea does not bind its position at sentencing, particularly with the defense

having rejected the plea offer. That is particularly so since it is likely that during trial preparation and trial, the government developed a sharper view of the facts of each robbery and made a focus more on this particular adjustment.

The trial record makes clear that the adjustment fits. As the overall offense level formed by these groups these, three counts are not grouped together. They must be combined instead under the multiple count rules, and that's what leads me to an offense level of 26.

The next issue involves the defendant's criminal history. The parties appear to agree that even if the career offender guideline did not apply, the defendant's Criminal History Category would be level VI. I agree with that based on the facts in the presentence report. I accept the calculations to that effect set out in the presentence report.

Putting all of this together, my determination is that if the career offender guideline did not apply, the defendant's guideline range would be between 120 and 150 months imprisonment.

The next issue then is whether the career offender guideline does apply. The parties dispute that issue, and I found everyone's sentencing submission to be helpful. I understand, Ms. Kunstler, that the career offender guideline has a dramatic effect on the defendant's sentencing range. It yields a guideline range that you regard as unreasonably high,

and that is a substantial argument, but the first order of business is to consider whether in fact as a literal matter of guideline application the career guideline applies.

Here I find that it does apply. Defense's main challenge is to the inclusion as one of the underlying crimes of violence of Mr. Kornegay's youthful offender conviction for second degree robbery. The facts adduced are that a jewelry store was robbed by a group of youths, including Mr. Kornegay, then age 16, and that one of the robbers pushed a store employee to the ground. Mr. Kornegay was ultimately sentenced to one and a third to four years imprisonment for this offense. Under the guidelines, second degree robbery is unquestionably a crime of violence under the guidelines. Factually, some degree of violence was used by a confederate of Mr. Kornegay's. On both of those grounds independently, I find, therefore, that this conviction qualifies and is properly tabulated in determining career offender status.

Therefore, I find, like the presentence report, that the career offender guideline applies here. The result of that is to increase Mr. Kornegay's offense level from level 26 to level 32. His Criminal History Category would remain the same at level VI. The resulting guideline range though would become, and does become, 210 to 262 months imprisonment, which I recognize is a substantial increase over the guideline range that would otherwise apply. Ms. Kunstler, in making this

finding I am not in any way stating that I believe that the guideline range is necessarily the proper range in which sentencing should apply. You are at full liberty to make, as you have effectively in your sentencing submission, the argument that sentencing range is unreasonably high. But as strict matter of guidelines math, I find that to be the correct and applicable guideline range.

The next subject I need to cover is departures, which is to say, within the framework of the Sentencing Guidelines. The defense argues that a downward departure below the career offender guideline is merited. Under Section 4A1.3(b) of the guidelines, a downward departure of one criminal history category is merited if the defendant's criminal history category substantially overrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history category or the likelihood that the defendant would commit further crimes. With respect, I do not find that to be the case. Mr. Kornegay has a long criminal history which was calculated at level VI based on his having 15 criminal history category points even before consideration was had of the career offender guideline.

In addition, I'm mindful that the evidence here convincingly established fully nine separate cell phone store robberies that he participated in; not just the three as to which there were substantive counts charged and found.

Criminal History Category VI thus aptly captures the length and

depth of Mr. Kornegay's criminal record. There is no evidence on which I can find less than a likelihood of recidivism.

Mr. Kornegay's track record is to the contrary. Therefore, I decline to downwardly depart within the guidelines framework.

That said, the defense has substantial arguments within the broader framework of the Section 3553(a) factors that a sentence within the guideline range of 210 to 262 months imprisonment overstates what is necessary here to take account of 3553(a) factors. It is my expectation coming into the sentencing that on the basis of those arguments and based on my consideration of the relevant factors, I will impose a sentence below the range set by the career offender statute.

So, I am denying the motion for a downward departure made as it is within the rather confining strictures of the Sentencing Guidelines. I don't find that a downward departure here is available as a matter of law. Even if I did, I would decline to exercise my discretion to depart. I would, and will, instead achieve the same objective of imposing a below Guidelines Sentence by means of making a downward variance under Section 3553(a).

So, that I think exhausts all the technical preliminaries. With that, does the government wish to be heard with respect to sentencing?

MS. CUCINELLA: Your Honor, for the most part, we are going to rest on the submission. We just reiterate that the

government believes a significant incarceratory sentence is appropriate here. The defendant has proven, as your Honor has just noted, again and again that this is what he goes back to. He has been given a number of chances. His incarceratory sentences thus far have not been significant, and he has almost immediately upon release each time gone back to committing robberies. We have real concerns of recidivism here, real concerns about the safety of the community, and we believe given those, that a significant incarceration is appropriate here.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me ask you whether you agree with the restitution amounts and addressees in the presentence report?

MS. CUCINELLA: I believe that those are correct. I have consulted with Ms. Griswold, and she has not raised them as being incorrect. So, going forward, I believe they are correct. If there are any errors, we will definitely address the Court and let probation know.

THE COURT: It would be my intention, inasmuch as there are specific numbers and addressees here, to include as part of the judgment in the case the order that restitution be made to those people in those amounts. On that assumption, I will ask you by Monday, if possible, to get me a restitution order that memorializes that.

MS. CUCINELLA: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: I take it the government is not seeking forfeiture on top of restitution?

MS. CUCINELLA: That's correct.

THE COURT: Does defense counsel wish to be heard?

MS. KUNSTLER: Yes, your Honor. I just wanted to make one factual correction. I believe your Honor said a jewelry store, when the robbery was a perfume store.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. That probably speaks to my broader insensitivity to matters of jewelry and perfume. In any event, I correct what I said.

MS. KUNSTLER: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, this is an unusual sentencing.

Mr. Kornegay is not a defendant and this is not a case that
easily fits into a box. He went to trial and lost. He fully
intends to appeal his conviction. Acceptance of responsibility
and remorse are areas in which I normally focus on in
sentencing do not apply here.

Despite that fact, as I argued in my papers and as the Court recognizes, it is our position that a sentence of 210 to 262 months is excessive. This is a case to me that really speaks to the parsimony clause and speaks to consideration of what's sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the sentencing factors.

Now, I recognize that this is an incredibly serious crime. I recognize that the Court must impose a sentence that

reflects that and reflects the other factors outlined in 3553(a)(2), but I do think that equities in this case support an individualized sentence.

I understand the Court knows this already, and a lot of what I prepared to write today, I don't feel the necessity to say given what the Court has already stated today, but I do want to note that in looking at the Exhibit that the government submitted as an attachment to its sentencing letter, the exhibit where it noted that — the report showed that a little less than 50 percent, that the average sentence for career offenders was 160 months, far lower than the guidelines range in this case. The government also noted that the report showed that defendants who did not receive government—sponsored below—guideline sentences, of those, a little more than 50 percent received within guideline sentences, so the other side of that coin is that a little less than 50 percent received below guideline sentences.

THE COURT: When you say "guideline sentence," you mean Sentencing Guidelines as generated by the career offender status?

MS. KUNSTLER: Yes, that about half of, according to that commission report, received below career offender guideline sentences. When the government highlights that number, I think their intention is to say Mr. Kornegay is a member of this class. These are a number of people who are

similarly situated to Mr. Kornegay, and of that a hundred percent, a little more than 50 are getting guideline sentences, career offender sentences.

But I think what our sentencing submission shows is that he is precisely the type of defendant who falls in the slightly less than 50 percent that receives non-guideline sentences. He is of that class of defendants that gives judges pause precisely because one of the offenses that triggers that guideline is an offense that is remote in time and that happened when he was a very young person. This is the group of offenders noted in that '86 Law Review Article I cited which addresses departures. This is also the group of offenders noted by Judge Bennett in U.S. v. Neuhaus, the opinion I attached to my papers.

The fact is that when Mr. Kornegay was 16-years-old, he was part of a large group of teenagers who robbed a perfume store. If that happened today, the crime might have been treated differently. We certainly look at young people differently today. There's been a large body of science and recent Supreme Court decisions about how the teenage brain works differently. Now we understand that teenagers make reckless decisions.

So, given what we know now, I see the sentence as an opportunity not to change the past but to acknowledge it, to acknowledge that we see youth differently today and to evaluate

the career offender guideline through that new lens of how young people make reckless, impulsive decisions that should not define the rest of their lives.

I understand this is in the context a person who went on to commit further crimes, but I submit that the longest term of incarceration Mr. Kornegay has received so far is 54 months. He has two substantial sentences: One for a crime committed at 16, and one for a crime committed at age 22. They were severe sentences. I understand that the government looks at this criminal history and says Mr. Kornegay is not a person who is getting the message; that he is not a person who has learned from his mistakes. But I think that these sentences were severe for somebody so young. It's also clear that Mr. Kornegay is a person who never got the help he needed and who never got a break from anyone and a person who was routed into the criminal justice system at a very young age.

I also want to recognize Mr. Kornegay's family who are here in the courtroom today to support him, who have written letters to this Court that show Mr. Kornegay is more than the sum of his crime; and not just letters from his family, your Honor, but letters from people who he is incarcerated with at the MCC; that Mr. Kornegay is a person with real relationships who form strong ties, who people care about, and who cares about others.

That to me also highlights a little bit of what is

unfortunate about where we find ourselves today in this courtroom. On balance, I stand with my papers and for the reasons argued in my papers that a sentence of 92 months, which is a considerable sentence, is a sentence that will reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence and protect the public from future crimes.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Kornegay, do you wish to make a statement?

(Audience speaking)

THE DEFENDANT: Can I stand?

THE COURT: Please by all means.

THE DEFENDANT: I just want to say I love y'all here.

(Audience speaking)

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, my family, you know, that's the only thing that I have in this world, so...

THE COURT: I would just ask you to speak up. I'm having a little difficulty hearing you.

THE DEFENDANT: I said my family is the only thing I have in this world, and it's the only people who has been there for me no matter what I went through. Even times when I was right and some things when I was wrong, you know, so I -- I just give them -- I just want to thank them for always being there for me and accepting the things that I've done and, you

know, just help me molding me to be the person I am today.

As far as my case, I -- I pretty much said as much as I could say about it because it's just another fight within a fight, you know. You know, it's a lot of -- it's a lot of points that have been taken away from me for this, and this situation, this process it's like one of the worst things I ever been through in my life, but I'll be all right. That's all.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kornegay.

I am going to take a few moments and collect my thoughts.

(Pause)

(Audience speaking)

THE COURT: Is there any reason why sentence should not now be imposed?

MS. CUCINELLA: No, your Honor.

MS. KUNSTLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: As I have stated, the guideline range that applies to this case based on application of the career offender guideline is between 210 and 262 months imprisonment. Without that guideline, the guideline range would be 120 to 150 months imprisonment.

Under the Supreme Court's decision in *Booker* and the cases that have followed it, the guideline range though is only one factor that a court must consider in deciding the

appropriate and reasonable sentence. The court is also required to consider the other factors set forth in Title 18
United States Code, Section 3553(a) of the sentencing statute.

Those factors include the following: The nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and the need for the sentence imposed to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

The court is required to impose a sentence sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set out above. That is the parsimony clause to which Mr. Kunstler referred to a few moments ago. I find that the sentence I am about to pronounce is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing that I've just mentioned.

Mr. Kornegay, I am obviously quite familiar with this case, having presided over the trial and I have read carefully the excellent sentencing submissions that I have received from both sides. I've given a lot of time and thought and attention to the appropriate sentence in your case in light of those

facts and in light of the statutory factors, the ones that I just reviewed, the ones that Section 3553(a) requires me consider.

These are my thoughts: The first Section 3553(a) factor that I considered is the seriousness of your offense. Yours was very serious. The evidence at trial showed that you and your co-conspirators robbed nine cell phone stores in New York City. Each time the group used cutting tools to steal display cell phones. On various robberies, those tools or knives were brandished at employees; and employees who attempted to interfere with the robbery or the robbers' escape were threatened or pushed out of the way.

The robbery is serious for much more than the merchandise that was taken. You created a serious risk each time that violence, maybe even deadly violence, would occur. It is a credit largely to the restraint of the security guards and other store employees that each time they had the chance to block or fight one of the robbers or prevent them from leaving, they eventually showed the good judgment to stand down. As I recall one of the trial witnesses saying, "It's only a cell phone." Of course, another reason they stood down was because of the wire cutters and knives that the robbers had with them. They were armed; the employees were not. My point is that it is really only a matter of good fortune and good judgment by the victims that none of the robberies led to serious injury or

even death.

The robberies were also deeply wrongful in the way they generated fear. I was really struck watching the security videos and listening to the witnesses how terrified some of them were, and who wouldn't be, by having a group of three or four men approximately enter a store, their identities partly concealed under hats and jackets, bearing cutting tools, brandishing wire cutters and/or knives, helping themselves to merchandise and threatening employees who got in their way and muscling others out of the way. Any incident like that would likely scar or scare an employee or, for that matter, a customer for perhaps a long time. You are among those responsible for that. It was inherit in your scheme and, indeed, a critical part of it to instill fear in the people that were robbed to get them to back off from getting in the way.

The final aspect of the seriousness of the offense is obvious, but I will say it anyway: It is the sheer number of stores that were hit: Nine stores in total. That is a lot of people who were robbed, scared and threatened.

Under Section 3553(a), I need to consider as well the need for what is called just punishment. Like the seriousness of the offense, this factor calls for a very long sentence here and for much the same reasons.

I also am to consider the need to promote respect for

the law. Here, too, a long sentence, I'm sorry to say, is needed, less the laws against robberies, including robberies facilitated by cutting tools be treated as less than vitally important.

I am also to consider the interest in general deterrence. That means the need to send a message to other people who would consider committing similar crimes; that is to say, store robberies, that is sufficient to deter them from following your lead. There is enough crime in the city that we can be sure there are people who every day consider robbing stores. Your sentence needs to be long enough to ensure that another would-be robber out there knows that if they rob multiple stores using knives or wire cutters no less and get caught, they can count on going to jail for a long time.

A very important consideration for me here is what is called specific deterrence. That means the need to send a message to you personally, Mr. Kornegay, that is sufficient to deter you from committing more crimes when you are released from jail. You have a long criminal history, which is aptly reviewed in the presentence report and in the government's sentencing submission. There is nothing in your history that says to me that any punishment previously inflicted has deterred you in any way from committing crimes. Indeed, you committed this spree of nine robberies after having been prosecuted for a very similar prior robbery. I cannot be sure

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whether any sentence I impose here will get through to you, but if any sentence does, it needs to be materially longer than your prior ones.

Under Section 3553(a) an important factor is also public protection, or what is called incapacitation. case, I find that factor to be extremely important. Given your long record of committing serial and similar robberies, there is every reason to believe that if you were at large again, you would rob again. There is nothing in the record before me that suggests any restraint or moral compunctions on your part to hold you back. There is nothing in the record that suggests that concerns of getting caught or getting put in prison hold you back. And you are no longer an adolescent. You can no longer credibly claim to have committed crimes out of the immaturity and recklessness of youth. I see that pattern in a lot of my cases, but it doesn't fit here. You committed these nine robberies from about age 27 through 29, and today you are 33. The record before me, instead, committing such crimes appears to be part of a settled pattern. Based on your life so far, a person could reasonably conclude that it is what you do. You have done and said nothing to me that says you have accepted responsibility for your mistakes. I understand you are empathetic to your family, and I respect the sincerity of that, but that is different.

From the letter you wrote me, you appear more focused

on what you perceive to be your counsel's shortcomings than on your own accountability. So, on the assumption that you have not been specifically deterred by this prosecution, I need to impose a long sentence simply to protect the public. Keeping you in jail for a long period of years is the one sure way to ensure that future employees at cell phone stores or other stores are not subjected to the terrifying invasions that the employees of these nine stores were. All of these factors, all the ones I've reviewed so far, separately and together, point towards a long prison sentence.

That said, there are some factors here that point in the other direction, and I want to review them now. To begin with, the robberies themselves did not have violence as their objective. As the videos show, the goal of the robbers was to take the display cell phones and to get in and get out as fast as humanly possible. To the extent threats or brandishing or pushing occurred, it was to achieve that goal. It does not appear that you had any desire to physically hurt someone for its own sake. That is important perspective, it is important context, and I have it firmly in mind as I reflect on your crimes.

Second, on the basis your counsel's extremely thoughtful sentencing submission, it appears to me that you have real difficulty making smart, rational assessments. That is reflected, frankly, in your dogged focus on the issue of

whether your first lawyer asked you to sign some form of waiver, which all of the lawyers and I assured have you is of no moment. It may be reflected in your difficulty finding common ground with your series of lawyers, very capable lawyers who I appointed sequentially to help you. It may be reflected in your persistent committing of crimes, including similar crimes directed at cell phone stores in the same few neighborhoods when your experience and common sense had to tell you, you would eventually get caught, and that this day would come. It may reflect itself in your decision to forego the government's earlier plea offer.

To be quite sure, I can't give you any credit for acceptance of responsibility. There isn't a shred of acceptance of responsibility reflected on this record. But to the extent there is a persistent rigidity in your thinking and a distrust of advice given to you, and to the extent that may reflect on some kind of organic inhibition within you, I consider it relevant to the just sentence.

Third, under Section 3553(a), I am to consider a defendant's history and his characteristics. I have already reviewed your history as it relates to this crime and to prior crimes, but from your counsel's sentencing submission, I saw a different side of you. I saw a well-loved family man, a fun uncle, a supportive fellow inmate; in short, a person who, with his family and in his private life, projects totally

differently than the hooded robber of the cell phone stores whom I saw on the videos.

I have received a number of letters on your behalf and I want to quote a few of them which gave me some insight which show the source of why I just said what I said. One of them is from your niece Quinazia Pauling, and she says of you that you are very nice; that you take her to school sometimes. "He is very important to me."

Your niece, Navia Anel Benton, also describes you as very fun. She says you tell her jokes and brings her snacks.

"He tells me he loves me every day."

Your goddaughter, Ania Martin, describes you as a very nice person who takes her and her sister and their cousin to school every day. "He is very important to me," she writes.
"I love him very much."

The handwriting is a little hard to read. The next letter is from what appears to be Dijon Pauling. Forgive me if I got the pronunciation wrong, but you are that letter-writer's uncle, and the letter reads: "He's always there if I need him or even if I didn't. I look forward to every moment I got to see him and talk about everything. He was the type of man to encourage the ones he loves to do what was right."

Garisha Pauling -- again, forgive the mispronunciation -- writes: "I wish my uncle was there to celebrate my recent birthday with me. He is a wonderful man

who deserves a better chance in life. My uncle is talented, funny, loving, kind-hearted, and a very intelligent man who has a unique personality, and he's always there for us when we need him the most."

Again, I'm giving excerpts, but they're revealing excerpts.

Daquan Fagan is the next letter writer, Mr. Kornegay's brother-in-law. He writes: "Over the past 12 years of knowing Raymond, I've learned he's very dependable, strong, willing and a kind-hearted person. He has been a backbone to me through many hard times in life. He is someone you can talk to and express yourself without him judging you. His words of encouragement was always powerful. They would help you get through the toughest days."

Tanisha Pauling, your sister writes: "Among other things, my brother Raymond loves music. He can sing very well. He also likes to write music. My brother also loves basketball. He struggles in his life, but if you have family, you can get through a lot. Raymond has a host of friends that love him and miss him dearly in our neighborhood."

There are a number of other letters. I am not reading them all, but finally your mother writes: He is a good child. She describes how you help her. He is not a bad person, and she asks me to take into account all of those good qualities.

Mr. Kornegay, on the day a person is sentenced, it is

appropriate that they be considered in the totality of their life experiences and not merely the crimes they committed. Your sentence today will reflect that, and I am taking into account your many positive qualifies as reflected in those letters. One of the things I see time and time again in this job is that people are complex, and that the same person who can commit a crime that society justly abhors also can be a good and gentle person in their private life, and I see that in you.

I've given a lot of thought today to how the guidelines fit here. Without the career offender guideline, your sentencing range would be between 120 and 150 months imprisonment. I don't find persuasive the defense's arguments for a sentence below that range. The conduct here is much too serious and much too pervasive in the interest in general and specific deterrence, and especially incapacitation, way too strong to justify any such sentence.

I've also given a lot of thought to the career offender guideline and the policy considerations underlying it as they apply in this case. My view here is that that guideline does capture something very real. The policy goals under that guideline are to incapacitate the career offender and to put others on notice that chronic violence will be punished by very high prison sentences.

For the reasons I've covered those goals with track

factors identified in 3553(a) are highly relevant here. The fact, Mr. Kornegay, that you participated in nine cell phone store robberies, whereas the guideline range here is calculated based on just three reinforces the characterization of you as a career offender.

It is my intention to impose a sentence somewhat above the guideline range that would otherwise apply to reflect the fact that policies underlying the career offender guideline do resonate and apply here. At the same time, I think that the career offender guideline here pushes the sentence way too high in this case. You are a recidivist many times over, and there is a grave risk that if at liberty, you would commit yet more crimes. But offset against that are the factors I reviewed a few moments ago, primarily the fact that your crimes here are not motivated by violence, it did not involve actual infliction of injury, and I've also taken into account your history and characteristics as I reviewed it a few moments ago.

In my view, to reflexively apply the career offender guideline here would elevate the form of that guideline over the substance of the 3553(a) factors. My judgment, therefore, is that a sentence below the career offender guideline but above the guideline that would apply without that guideline is in order here.

I am now going to state the sentence I intend to impose. Counsel will have a final opportunity to make legal

objections before the sentenced is finally imposed.

Mr. Kornegay, would you please rise.

After assessing the particular facts of this case and the factors under Section 3553(a), including the Sentencing Guidelines, it is the judgment of the Court that you are to serve a sentence of 180 months imprisonment in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be followed by a period of three years supervised release. I impose the same sentence on each of the four counts. The sentence is to run concurrently.

As to supervised release, the standard conditions of supervised release shall apply. In addition, you will be subject to the following mandatory conditions which are set out in paragraph page 24 of the presentence report:

You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

You shall not possess a firearm or destructive device.

You shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance, and you shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.

In addition, you must meet the following special conditions, each of which I have determined are appropriate on the facts of this case: You shall submit your person, residence, place of business, vehicle or other premises under

your control to a search on the basis that the probation officer has a reasonable belief that contraband or evidence of a violation of the conditions of release may be found. You shall provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information. You shall not incur any credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless you are in compliance with the payment schedule set with respect to the payment of restitution. You are to report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours of release from custody.

Separately, I have the legal authority to impose a fine here. I am not going to do so. I am persuaded that you don't have the ability to pay it, and to the extent you do have some money, it ought to be used to pay restitution to the victims here.

I am required to impose, and do impose, a mandatory special assessment of \$400; \$100 for each much your four crimes of conviction; that amount to be paid immediately

With respect to restitution, I am going to order the restitution be paid as set out on page 25 of the presentence report, and, again, I'm directing the government to get me a restitution order by the end of Monday that memorializes the terms, payees and addressees, but briefly, you are to pay \$3,499.90 to T-Mobile U.S.A. at the name and address reflected on page 25 of the presentence report, and \$3,398 to AT&T, also

at the name and address reflected in the presentence report. 1 The government is not pursuing forfeiture, and, therefore, I do 2 not order it here. 3 4 Does either counsel know of any legal reason why this sentence should not be imposed as stated? 5 6 MS. CUCINELLA: No, your Honor. 7 MS. KUNSTLER: No, your Honor. THE COURT: The sentence as stated is imposed. 8 9 Are there any open counts, Ms. Cucinella? 10 MS. CUCINELLA: I don't believe so. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Kornegay, I've mentioned this before, 12 but I will now mention it officially. You have a right to 13 appeal your conviction and your sentence. If you are unable to 14 pay for the cost of an appeal, you may apply for leave to 15 appeal in forma pauperis. The notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment convict of conviction. 16 17 Ms. Kunstler has assured me she will file that timely. 18 Is there anything further from the government? 19 MS. CUCINELLA: No, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Is there anything further from the 21 defense? 22 MS. KUNSTLER: No, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Please be seated. I want to say a word to 24 Mr. Kornegay's friends and family. 25 Ladies and gentlemen, I want to acknowledge the fact

that you are here, and I want to thank those of you who wrote letters to me. Sentencing is the hardest thing I do, and the hardest part about it is to take the measure of the defendant on sentencing and to consider them as more than just a person who committed a particular crime. That is not easy, and it is often very hard to get a sense of who the person is based on the limited materials that are provided to me.

So, in a case like this when I get letters like the beautiful letters I've received from many of you about Mr. Kornegay, I'm appreciative because I get a better sense of who that person is. The letters you wrote here today gave me a sense of a different side of him, and I can assure you that they made a difference in my determination of what the appropriate sentence was here. So, I thank you for writing, and please know that as hard as I'm sure it is to hear this proceeding and the sentence pronounced, you made a real contribution to him and affected to his favor the sentence that I did pronounce.

Second of all, the very fact that you are all here for him on what has to be one of the hardest days in his life gives me confidence that you will be with him the rest of the way:

When he is in prison and, most importantly, when he is released, when I think he really will need the guidance of loving family members and friend network to make sure, frankly, that this doesn't happen again. It is troubling to me that

there have been as many crimes reflected as there are in his 1 presentence report and as I heard about at trial. 2 3 You have here a good man. It is my hope that the guidance of his family will help lead him in the next chapter 4 5 of his life to lead a law-abiding life. In any event, I thank 6 you for being here and for participating in the ways you have. 7 We stand adjourned. Let me ask, Ms. Kunstler, do you want me to recommend 8 9 to the Bureau of Prisons where Mr. Kornegay is to be assigned? 10 MS. KUNSTLER: May I have a moment? THE COURT: Of course. 11 12 MS. KUNSTLER: We have no specific recommendation 13 other than it be close to New York City to allow family 14 visitation. 15 THE COURT: You'd like me to designate that he be located at a facility as close to New York as possible? 16 17 MS. KUNSTLER: Yes. 18 THE COURT: I'd be glad to do that and I will do that. Thank you. We stand adjourned. 19 20 (Adjourned) 21 22 23 24 25